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Abstract
This paper discusses a decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court issued in 
 December 2016, in which the judges refer to the country’s constitutional identity to jus-
tify the government’s refusal to apply the eu’s refugee relocation scheme in Hungary. 
The paper concludes that this abuse of constitutional identity for merely nationalistic 
political purposes discredits every genuine and legitimate reference to national con-
stitutional identity claims, and strengthens calls for an end to constitutional pluralism 
in the eu altogether.
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1 Introduction
Before and after Hungary’s accession to the eu, the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court, a powerful and still independent institution, developed a consistent 
jurisprudence regarding the primacy of eu law. This was a moderate version 
of a German-type limited primacy approach. The pre-accession constitutional 
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amendment of 2002 was supported by then-opposition leader Viktor Orbán, 
who was reluctant to insert a provision explicitly accepting eu primacy in the 
text of the constitution, but like the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence, was 
ready to acknowledge the role of shared European constitutional principles 
in what was still – at that time – Hungary’s liberal democratic constitutional 
system. But since the 2010 parliamentary elections, Hungary has set off on a 
journey to become an ‘illiberal’ eu Member State which does not comply with 
the shared values of rule of law and democracy: the ‘basic structure’ of Europe. 
Among the elements of the ‘illiberal state’ is the elimination of checks and 
balances, first and foremost the exercise of control over the once very active 
Constitutional Court.1 This process began with the alteration of the system for 
nominating Constitutional Court justices, giving governing parties the exclu-
sive power to nominate and subsequently elect justices.2 The new Fundamen-
tal Law of 20113 also considerably restricted ex-post control over the power of 
the Court by withdrawing its right to review financial laws. In 2013, the Fourth 
Amendment4 to the new constitution annulled the entire case law of the Con-
stitutional Court from 1990–2011. By that time, the majority of the justices were 
loyal to the governing parties.5
1 See a more detailed analysis of the lack of checks and balances in Miklós Bánkuti and Gá-
bor Halmai & Kim Lane Scheppele, “From Separation of Powers to a Government without 
Checks: Hungary’s Old and New Constitutions”, in Gábor Attila Tóth (ed.), Constitution for a 
Disunited Nation. On Hungary’s 2011 Fundamental Law (ceu Press, Budapest, 2012).
2 The new procedure replaced the previous consensual one. In July 2010, the government made 
use of the new rules, and elected to the bench two new judges who did not even fulfil the 
legal requirements set for justices. Later that year the government also expanded the num-
ber of justices in the Court from 11 to 15 to give themselves four more seats to fill with non-
consensual candidates.
3 Magyarország Alaptörvénye (25 April 2011). For the ‘official’ English translation of the Funda-
mental Law, see: <http://www.kormany.hu/download/7/99/30000/THE%20FUNDAMENTAL 
%20LAW%20OF%20HUNGARY.pdf>.
4 See the ‘official’ English text of the amendment provided by the government: Council of Eu-
rope, Venice Commission, “Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary and 
Technical Note”, cdl-ref(2013)014-e, Strasbourg, 21 March 2013, available at <http://www 
.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-REF%282013%29014-e>.
5 In February 2013, an eighth justice out of the 15 members of the Constitutional Court was 
added, and in April 2013, a ninth Fidesz justice joined the bench with the exclusive votes of 
the governing parties without consultation with opposition parties, or civil or professional 
organizations. In this way, the justices elected by consensus became a minority. By now all 
the members of the Court are loyal to the government.
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From the very beginning, the government of Viktor Orbán has justified non-
compliance with eu law by referring to national sovereignty,6 and lately – as an 
immediate reaction to eu efforts to solve the refugee crisis – to the country’s 
constitutional identity guaranteed in Article 4(2) of the Treaty on the European 
Union (teu). In its Decision 22/2016 ab on the interpretation of Article E) (2) 
of the Fundamental Law, the packed Constitutional Court rubberstamped the 
government’s constitutional identity defense.
6 The first reaction of the Hungarian government to the ‘Tavares report’ of 3 July 2013 of the Euro-
pean Parliament on the Hungarian constitutional situation (European Parliament, Report on 
the situation of fundamental rights: standards and practices in Hungary (pursuant to the Eu-
ropean Parliament resolution of 16 February 2012) (2012/2130(ini)), 25 June 2013, available at 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2013-0229 
&language=EN>) was not a sign of willingness to comply with the recommendations of 
the report but, rather, a harsh rejection. Two days after the European Parliament adopted the 
report at its plenary session, the Hungarian Parliament adopted Resolution 69/2013 on “the 
equal treatment due to Hungary” (69/2013. (vii. 5.) ogy Határozat, 26 November 2015, avail-
able <http://www.complex.hu/kzldat/o13h0069.htm/o13h0069.htm>). The document is writ-
ten in the first person plural as an anti-European manifesto on behalf of all Hungarians: “We, 
Hungarians, do not want a Europe any longer where freedom is limited and not widened. 
We do not want a Europe any longer where the Greater abuses his power, where national 
sovereignty is violated and where the Smaller has to respect the Greater. We have had enough 
of dictatorship after 40 years behind the iron curtain.” (Translation by the author.) The reso-
lution argues that the European Parliament exceeded its jurisdiction by passing the report, 
and creating institutions that violate Hungary’s sovereignty as guaranteed by the teu. The 
Hungarian text also points out that behind this abuse of power lie business interests, which 
were violated by the Hungarian government by reducing the costs of energy paid by families. 
This in turn could undermine the interest of many European companies, which for years 
have gained extra profits from their monopoly in Hungary. In its conclusion, the Hungarian 
Parliament called on the Hungarian government “not to cede to the pressure of the European 
Union, not to let the nation’s rights guaranteed in the fundamental treaty be violated, and to 
continue the politics of improving life for Hungarian families”. These words very much reflect 
the Orbán government’s view of ‘national freedom’, which emphasizes the liberty of the state 
(or the nation) to determine its own laws: “This is why we are writing our own constitution … 
And we don’t want any unsolicited help from strangers who are keen to guide us … Hungary 
must turn on its own axis”. (For the original, Hungarian-language text of Orbán’s speech, en-
titled ‘Nem leszünk gyarmat!’ [‘We won’t be a colony any longer!’] see e.g., <http://2010-2015 
.miniszterelnok.hu/cikk/nem_leszunk_gyarmat_>. The English-language translation of ex-
cerpts from Orbán’s speech was made available by Hungarian officials, see e.g., Kester Eddy, 
“Orban compares eu to Soviet Union”, Financial Times (15 March 2012), at: <https://www 
.ft.com/content/6feaca90-6ecb-11e1-afb8-00144feab49a>).
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This comment proceeds as follows: after describing the government’s po-
litical and legal reaction to the refugee crisis, I discuss attempts to legitimize 
non-compliance with the eu relocation plan, first by an invalid referendum, 
followed by a failed constitutional amendment, and finally by a decision of the 
Constitutional Court.
2 The Government’s Anti-migration Policy as a Matter of 
Constitutional Identity?
As early as May 2015, a few days after many hundreds of refugees had drowned 
in the Mediterranean Sea, Viktor Orbán announced that ‘We need no refugees’, 
arguing that Europe does not need immigrants at all, and that the European 
Union should be sealed and defended against intruders by the military, and 
should not overreach in its immigration and refugee policies. Rather, Member 
States should formulate their own policies and deal with their unwanted im-
migrants as they see fit. In the summer of 2015, the Hungarian government left 
thousands of refugees to languish in fields and in the streets, forcibly herded 
others into detention camps, and fired water cannon and teargas at refugees 
gathered against the razor fence it had erected, first on its border with Serbia, 
and later with Croatia, another eu Member State. Viktor Orbán, styling him-
self as the defender of Europe’s ‘Christian civilization’ against an Islamic inva-
sion, managed to encourage other eastern European governments to follow his 
example.
In order to legitimate this policy against Hungary’s unwanted immigrants, 
the government announced it would hold a ‘national consultation’. The gov-
ernment sent out eight million questionnaires to the voting-age population, 
with questions like these: “Do you agree that mistaken immigration policies 
contribute to the spread of terrorism? In your opinion, did Brussels’ policies 
on immigration and terrorism fail? Would you support a new regulation that 
would allow the government to place immigrants who illegally entered the 
country into internment camps?”7
After this psychological preparation, the Parliament amended the asylum 
law, and adopted a National List of Safe Countries, considering Serbia a safe 
7 Gábor Halmai, “Hungary’s Anti-European Immigration Laws”, Institut für die Wissenschaften 
vom Menschen/Institute for Human Sciences (4 November 2015), available at <http://www.iwm 
.at/transit/transit-online/hungarys-anti-european-immigration-laws/>; Gábor Halmai, “Vik-
tor Orbán’s rampage to attract more far right voters”, Verfassungsblog (7 May 2015), available 
at <http://verfassungsblog.de/viktor-orbans-rampage-to-attract-more-far-right-voters/>.
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third country for asylum-seekers (in contradiction with the clear position of 
the European Court of Human Rights8 and the Hungarian Supreme Court9). 
These changes, which entered into force on 1 August 2015, accelerated asylum 
proceedings, rendering an ineffective one-instance judicial review with unrea-
sonably short deadlines into a quasi-automatic rejection at first glance of over 
99% of asylum claims (as 99% of asylum-seekers entered Hungary from Ser-
bia). The same amendments also entitled the government to declare a ‘state 
of migration emergency’, if more than 500 migrants seek asylum daily for a 
month, if 2000 migrants are in transit camps for a week, or if migrants riot 
anywhere in the country. Such emergency situations entitle the government 
to send fully armed soldiers to guard the borders with dogs, rubber bullets, 
and teargas, in addition to the police, who are normally authorized to do so. In 
June 2016, National Assembly representatives of the Fidesz-kdnp (the Chris-
tian Democratic People’s Party) governing alliance and the radical-nationalist 
opposition party Jobbik approved the Sixth Amendment to the Fundamental 
Law. This amendment authorizes the National Assembly to declare, at the ini-
tiative of the government, a “terrorism state of emergency” (terrorveszélyhe-
lyzet) in the event of a terrorist attack or a “significant and direct danger of a 
terrorist attack” (terrortámadás jelentős és közvetlen veszélye). In March 2017, 
the Hungarian Parliament passed an amendment to the Asylum Act that forces 
all asylum seekers into guarded detention camps. While their cases are being 
decided, asylum seekers, including women and children over the age of 14, will 
be herded into shipping containers surrounded by a high razor-fence on the 
Hungarian side of the border.10
8 “The Court observes that between January 2013 and July 2015 Serbia was not considered a 
safe third country by Hungary. This was so in accordance with reports from international 
institutions regarding the shortcomings of asylum proceedings in Serbia […] However, 
the 2015 legislative change produced an abrupt shift in the Hungarian stance on Serbia 
from the perspective of asylum proceedings. The altered position of the Hungarian au-
thorities in this matter begs the question whether it reflects a substantive improvement 
in the guarantees afforded to asylum-seekers in Serbia. However, no convincing expla-
nation or reasons have been adduced by the Government for this reversal of attitude, 
especially in light of the reservations of the unhcr and respected international human 
rights organisations expressed as late as December 2016.” See ECtHR, Ilias and Ahmed v. 
Hungary, Appl. No.47287/15, Judgment of 14 March 2017.
9 2/2012. (xii. 10.) kmk opinion of the Administrative and Labour Law Collegium of the 
Supreme Court based on the assessment by the unchr.
10 On 14 March 2017, the European Court of Human Rights found that the detention of two 
Bangladeshi asylum-seekers for more than three weeks in a guarded compound without 
a formal, reasoned decision and without appropriate judicial review had amounted to a 
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With these legislative measures adopted, the government started a cam-
paign against the eu’s relocation plan. The first step was a referendum ini-
tiated by the government. On 2 October 2016, Hungarian voters went to the 
polls to answer one referendum question: “Do you want to allow the European 
Union to mandate the relocation of non-Hungarian citizens to Hungary with-
out the approval of the National Assembly?”. Although 92 percent of those who 
cast votes and 98 percent of all the valid votes agreed with the government, 
answering ‘no’ (6% were spoiled ballots), the referendum was invalid because 
the turnout was only around 40 percent, instead of the required 50 percent.11
Despite the fact that at the time of the referendum the idea of a constitutional 
amendment was not on the table, arguing with the 3.3 million  Hungarians who 
voted in favor of the anti-eu referendum, Prime Minister Orbán introduced 
the Seventh Amendment to defend Hungarian constitutional identity to po-
litically legitimize non-compliance with eu law in this area. The draft amend-
ment touched upon the National Avowal, the Europe clause and the provision 
on interpretation of the Fundamental law in the Foundation part, and the 
provision on prohibition of expulsion of Hungarian citizens and the collective 
expulsion of foreigners in the part on Freedoms and Responsibilities.12
The proposal was to add a new sentence to the National Avowal, following 
the sentence, “We honor the achievements of our historical constitution and we 
honor the Holy Crown, which embodies the constitutional continuity of Hun-
gary’s statehood and the unity of the nation”. The new sentence would read: 
“We hold that the defense of our constitutional self-identity, which is rooted in 
our historical constitution, is the fundamental responsibility of the state.”
de facto deprivation of their liberty (Article 5 of the Convention) and right to effective 
remedy (Article 13). The Court also found a violation of Article 3 on account of the appli-
cants’ expulsion to Serbia insofar as they had not had the benefit of effective guarantees 
to protect them from exposure to a real risk of being subjected to inhuman and degrad-
ing treatment (Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary, ibid.). We should take into account that this 
unlawful detention of the applicants in the transit zone was based on less restrictive rules 
enacted in 2015.
11 Gábor Halmai, “The Invalid Anti-Migrant Referendum in Hungary”, Verfassungsblog (4 
October 2016), available at <http://verfassungsblog.de/hungarys-anti-european-immigra 
tion-laws/>; Krisztina Than, Gergely Szakacs, “Hungarians vote to reject migrant quo-
tas, but turnout too low to be valid”, Reuters (2 October 2016), available at <https://www 
.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-hungary-referendum/hungarians-vote-to-reject 
-migrant-quotas-but-turnout-too-low-to-be-valid-idUSKCN1213Q3?il=0>.
12 The National Avowal is the preamble of the 2011 Fundamental Law of Hungary; the Foun-
dation part contains the main principles, while the Rights and Responsibilities part con-
tains the fundamental rights and obligations.
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Paragraph 2 of the Europe clause (Article E) of the Fundamental Law would 
be amended to read: “Hungary, as a Member State of the European Union and 
in accordance with the international treaty, will act sufficiently in accordance 
with the rights and responsibilities granted by the founding treaty, in conjunc-
tion with powers granted to it under the Fundamental Law together with other 
Member States and European Union institutions. The powers referred to in this 
paragraph must be in harmony with the fundamental rights and freedoms es-
tablished in the Fundamental Law and must not place restrictions on Hungarian 
territory, its population, the state, or its inalienable rights.” (The new sentence 
appears here in italics.)
A new paragraph 4 would be added to Article R: “(4) It is the responsibility 
of every state institution to defend Hungary’s constitutional identity.”
The following new Paragraph 1 was planned to be added to Article xiv: “(1) 
No foreign population can be settled in Hungary. Foreign citizens, not includ-
ing the citizens of countries in the European Economic Area, in accordance 
with the procedures established by the National Assembly for Hungarian ter-
ritory, may have their documentation individually evaluated by the Hungarian 
authorities”.
All 131 members of parliament (mps) of the Fidesz-kdnp governing coali-
tion voted in favor of the proposed amendment, while all 69 opposition mps 
either did not vote (66 representatives) or voted against the amendment 
(3 representatives). The proposed amendment thus fell two votes short of the 
two-thirds majority required to approve amendments to the Fundamental 
Law.13 Although in principle Jobbik supported the proposed Seventh Amend-
ment, the party’s mps did not participate in the vote because the government 
had failed to satisfy Jobbik’s demand for repeal of the Hungarian Investment 
Immigration Program, which grants permanent residence in Hungary to citi-
zens of foreign countries who purchase 300,000 euros in government ‘residen-
cy bonds’.14
3 Decision 22/2016. (xii. 5.) of the Hungarian Constitutional Court
After the failed constitutional amendment, the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court, loyal to the government, came to the rescue of Orbán’s constitu-
tional identity defense of its policies on migration. The Court carved out an 
13 Due to two by-elections in early 2015 Fidesz lost its 2/3 majority by two votes.
14 During the vote on the amendment, Jobbik mps displayed a sign referring to the program 
reading “Those who allow terrorists in for money are traitors!”.
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 abandoned15 petition of the also loyal Commissioner for Fundamental Rights 
(hereinafter: Commissioner), filed a year earlier, before the referendum was 
initiated. In his motion, the Commissioner asked the Court to deliver an ab-
stract interpretation of the Fundamental Law in connection with Council 
 Decision 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015.16 The Commissioner asked the fol-
lowing four questions:
1. Whether the absolute prohibition of expulsion of foreigners from Hunga-
ry in Article xiv (1) of the Fundamental Law17 forbids this kind of action 
only by the Hungarian authorities, or if it also covers actions performed 
by the bodies or institutions of the Hungarian State as necessary for im-
plementing an unlawful collective expulsion executed by another State.
2. Whether under Article E) (2), state bodies, agencies, and institutions are 
entitled or obliged to implement eu legal acts that conflict with funda-
mental rights stipulated by the Fundamental Law. If not, which state or-
gan can establish that fact?
3. Whether under Article E) (2), the exercise of powers bound to the extent 
necessary may restrict implementation of an ultra vires act. If state bod-
ies, agencies, and institutions are not entitled or obliged to implement 
ultra vires eu legislation, which state organ can establish that fact?
4. Whether Article xiv (1) and Article E) can be interpreted in a way that 
authorizes or restricts Hungarian state bodies, agencies, and institutions, 
within the legal framework of the eu, to facilitate relocation of a large 
group of foreigners legally staying in one Member State without their ex-
press or implied consent and without personalized and objective criteria 
applied during their selection.
The Commissioner’s own interpretation was clear from the formulation of the 
questions. With regard to the first question, the Commissioner argued that “the 
15 The Constitutional Court has no deadline to decide on petitions.
16 The petition was based on Section 38 para.(1) of Act cli of 2011 on the Constitutional 
Court, which reads: “On the petition of Parliament or its standing committee, the Presi-
dent of the Republic, the Government, or the Commissioner of the Fundamental Rights, 
the Constitutional Court shall provide an interpretation of the provisions of the Funda-
mental Law regarding a concrete constitutional issue, provided that the interpretation 
can be directly deduced from the Fundamental Law”.
17 Article xiv (1) reads as follows: “Hungarian citizens shall not be expelled from the territo-
ry of Hungary and may return at any time from abroad. Foreigners staying in the territory 
of Hungary may only be expelled on the basis of a lawful decision. Collective expulsion 
shall be prohibited”.
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rules of international law grant a right for asylum seekers waiting to be trans-
ferred to stay in Italy or Greece until the end of the asylum procedure”. In the 
context of the Council decision, the Commissioner concluded that although 
“the collective expulsion was – prima facie – implemented by these two Mem-
ber States”, nevertheless, since “the transfer cannot be exercised by a Member 
State without the reception act of another Member State (according to the peti-
tion this Member State would be Hungary if implementing the relocation plan – 
G.H.): the latter is an indispensable act of the former”. The question does not 
seem to take into account that Article xiv (1) of the Fundamental Law applies 
explicitly to Hungarian citizens, or the collective expulsion of foreigners from 
the territory of Hungary, and that non-Hungarian asylum seekers relocated 
due to the Council Decision would not be expelled by Italy or Greece. But the 
petition is also judgmental regarding the powers of the eu, when claiming that 
“the European Union has no competence to adopt regulations affecting the 
stay of certain groups of foreigners in the territory of the Member States”.18
By rendering the petition admissible, in its Decision 22/2016 (xii. 5.) ab of 
30 November 2016,19 the Court decided to answer the first question related to 
the interpretation of Article xiv of the Fundamental Law in a separate judg-
ment.20 Imre Juhász, one of the justices, wrote a concurring opinion in which he 
disagreed with the majority decision to separate the part of the petition on in-
terpreting Article xiv (1) of the Fundamental Law. In his view “the  separation – 
which in fact postpones adoption of the decision for an indefinite period – is 
indeed questionable in the light of the fact that the Council Decision applies 
to persons who arrive(d) in the territory of Italy or Greece.”
The Court identified question 2 as a reference to the issue whether a legal 
act of the European Union can violate fundamental rights, while question 3 
concerned the evaluation of ultra vires acts of the Union. These two questions, 
18 In my view the legal basis for this is article 78(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, which states that: “In the event of one or more Member States being 
confronted by an emergency situation characterised by a sudden inflow of nationals of 
third countries, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may adopt provisional 
measures for the benefit of the Member State(s) concerned. It shall act after consulting 
the European Parliament”.
19 Hungarian Constitutional Court, Decision 22/2016. (xii. 5.) ab (30 November 2016). The 
English translation of the decision is available on the homepage of the Constitutional 
Court: <http://hunconcourt.hu/uploads/sites/3/2017/11/en_22_2016.pdf>. The citations 
are from this translation.
20 See Injunction X/3327-31/2015. On the separation: The Constitutional Court has the power 
to separate parts of a petition, and decide them separately from each other. The decision 
on interpretation of Article xiv (1) of the Fundamental Law has not yet been published.
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the Court argued, are clearly constitutional issues to be examined by the Court 
directly at the level of the Fundamental Law, as they satisfy the condition of 
concreteness under Article 38 (1) of the Act on the Constitutional Court.21 
Question 4 could only be interpreted in the framework of questions 2 and 3. 
Therefore, the Court explained its response to question 4 in its response to 
questions 2 and 3. In other words, the Court tried to avoid directly answering 
the question about the constitutionality of the eu’s power of relocation.
Answering questions 2–4, the Court established that its own competence 
was regulated neither by the Fundamental Law, nor the Act on the Constitu-
tional Court on fundamental rights review and ultra vires review, the latter 
composed of a sovereignty review and an identity review. But before creating 
these new competences for themselves, the justices examined the positions 
taken by the European Court of Justice (ecj) and Member State constitutional 
courts. Referring to Costa v. Enel,22 the Hungarian Constitutional Court ac-
knowledged “the fact that from the point of view of the ecj, eu law is defined 
as an independent and autonomous legal order”, but quoting the Kloppenburg 
judgment23 of the German Federal Constitutional Court, the Hungarian jus-
tices stated that it is Member State “national enforcement acts that ultimately 
determine the extent of primacy to be enjoyed by eu law against the relevant 
Member State’s own law in the Member State concerned”.
On the basis of a review of the case law of many of the Member States’ 
supreme and constitutional courts, including the Lisbon judgment of the 
 German Federal Constitutional Court, the Hungarian justices established that 
“within its own scope of competences on the basis of a relevant petition, in 
exceptional cases and as a resort of ultima ratio, i.e. while respecting constitu-
tional dialogue between the Member States, it can examine whether exercising 
competences on the basis of Article E) (2) of the Fundamental Law results in 
a violation of human dignity, the essential content of any other fundamental 
right or the sovereignty (including the extent of the competences transferred 
by the State) and the constitutional self-identity of Hungary”.24
21 Section 38(1) reads: “On the petition of Parliament or its standing committee, the Presi-
dent of the Republic, the Government, or the Commissioner of Fundamental Rights, the 
Constitutional Court shall provide an interpretation of the provisions of the Fundamen-
tal Law regarding a concrete constitutional issue, provided that the interpretation can be 
directly deduced from the Fundamental Law”. (Emphasis added – G.H.),
22 ecj, Case 6-64, Costa v. enel (15 July 1964), ecli:eu:c:1964:66.
23 bverfge 75, 223 [242] (1987) – Kloppenburg-Beschluß.
24 22/2016. (xii. 5.) ab, op. cit. note 19, para.46.
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With regard to the fundamental rights review, the Court established that 
“any exercise of public authority in the territory of Hungary (including the joint 
exercise of competences with other Member States) is linked to fundamental 
rights”.25 The fundamental rights review is based on Article E) (2) and Article i 
(1) of the Fundamental Law. The latter provision declares that “The inviolable 
and inalienable fundamental rights of man shall be respected. It shall be the 
primary obligation of the State to protect these rights.” Having these rules in 
mind, and after referring to the Solange decisions of the German Federal Con-
stitutional Court, and explicitly to the decision of 15 December 2015 (2 BvR 
2735/14), and the need for cooperation in the eu and the primacy of eu law, 
the Court stated that it “cannot set aside the ultima ratio protection of human 
dignity and the essential contents of fundamental rights, and it must recognize 
that the joint exercise of competences under Article E) (2) of the Fundamental 
Law would not result in a violation of human dignity or the essential content 
of fundamental rights”.26
Regarding the ultra vires review, the Court argued that there were two main 
limits on conferred or jointly exercised competencies under Article E) (2): “the 
joint exercise of a competence shall not violate Hungary’s sovereignty (sov-
ereignty control), and on the other hand it shall not lead to the violation of 
constitutional identity (identity control)”.27  But the Court also emphasized 
that “the direct subject of sovereignty- and identity control is not a legal act of 
the Union or its interpretation, therefore the Court shall not comment on the 
validity or invalidity of the application of primacy with respect to such acts of 
the Union”.28
The constitutional foundation of the sovereignty review is Article B) (1) of 
the Fundamental Law, which states: “Hungary shall be an independent, demo-
cratic rule-of-law State”. Paragraphs (3) and (4) contain the popular sovereignty 
principle: “(3) The source of public power shall be the people”, “(4) Power shall 
be exercised by the people through elected representatives or, in exceptional 
cases, directly”. The Court warned that these provisions of the Fundamental 
Law “shall not be emptied out by the Union clause in Article E)”, and it estab-
lished that “the maintenance of Hungary’s sovereignty should be presumed 
when reviewing the joint exercise of competences” that have already been 
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The protection of constitutional identity, the Court argued, is based on 
 Article 4(2) teu and on “informal cooperation with the ecj based on the 
 principles of equality and collegiality, with mutual respect to each other”.30 
The Court “interprets the concept of constitutional identity as Hungary’s self-
identity and it unfolds the content of this concept from case to case, on the 
basis of the entire Fundamental Law and certain provisions thereof, in ac-
cordance with the National Avowal and the achievements of our historical 
 constitution – as required by Article R) (3) of the Fundamental Law”.31 The 
Court held that “the constitutional self-identity of Hungary is not a list of static 
and closed values, nevertheless many of its important components – identical 
with the constitutional values generally accepted today – can be highlighted as 
examples: freedoms, the separation of powers, a republic as the form of gov-
ernment, respect for autonomy under public law, freedom of religion, the ex-
ercise of lawful authority, parliamentarism, equality of rights, acknowledging 
judicial power, protection of nationalities living with us”.32 According to the 
Court, these are the achievements of the Hungarian historical constitution on 
which the legal system rests.
The Court held that “the constitutional self-identity of Hungary is a fun-
damental value not created by the Fundamental Law – it is merely acknowl-
edged by the Fundamental Law, consequently constitutional identity cannot 
be waived by way of an international treaty”.33 Therefore, the Court argued, 
“the protection of constitutional identity shall remain the duty of the Consti-
tutional Court as long as Hungary is a sovereign State”.34  Because sovereignty 
and constitutional identity are in contact with each other in many aspects, 
“their review should be performed with due regard to each other in specific 
cases”.35
Based on the above, the Court came back to the Commissioner’s question 
related to the transfer of third-country nationals in the context of the eu, 
and answered that question in the framework of this abstract constitutional 
interpretation as follows: “If human dignity, another fundamental right, the 
sovereignty of Hungary (including the extent of the transferred competenc-
es) or its self-identity based on its historical constitution can be presumed to 
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 Fundamental Law, the Constitutional Court may, in the course of exercising its 
competences, examine the existence of an alleged violation on the basis of a 
relevant petition”.36 And indeed this sentence is also the holding (dictum) of 
the judgment, which stands at the very beginning of the decision.
Looking at the competence of the Constitutional Court, neither the Funda-
mental Law nor the Act on the Constitutional Court authorizes the Court to 
perform this review. Article 24 (2) of the Fundamental Law states that in every 
listed jurisdiction of normative control (points a)–c) and e)) the subjects of 
review are either Hungarian legal norms or judicial decisions. Article T) (2) of 
the Fundamental Law lists all the legal regulations of Hungarian authorities, 
without mentioning legal acts of the European Union, which consequently 
cannot be subject to any review procedure of the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court. According to Article 23 (3) of the Act on the Constitutional Court, the 
Court is authorized to carry out a preliminary review of the conformity of an 
international treaty or its provisions with the Fundamental Law. However, this 
competence certainly does not apply to eu legal regulations.
Interestingly, although three of the justices recognized that the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court does not have the power to review eu legal acts, this did 
not motivate them to write a dissent by rejecting the Commissioner’s petition. 
István Stumpf, in his concurring opinion, claimed that the holding of the deci-
sion is limited to approving the review of “the joint exercise of competences 
under Article E) (2) of the Fundamental Law”, and although the reasoning deals 
with review of eu laws, the holding “only reaches a self-evident conclusion”.37 
But he fails to explain how the task could possibly be completed without re-
viewing eu legal regulation. In my view, a review of Hungarian application of 
an eu decision would not amount to a review of eu law. In his concurring opin-
ion, Béla Pokol takes it for granted that the holding of the decision declared 
monitoring by the Constitutional Court procedure to be against the legal acts 
of the Union as a possibility in the course of exercising all of its competences, 
although as pointed out earlier in this paper, this is not prescribed by either 
the Fundamental Law, or the Act on the Constitutional Court. Pokol thinks 
that “the right of initiating the procedure should have only been given to the 
Government – by the Court.38 In other words, Pokol assumes a non- existent 
legislative power of the Constitutional Court. László Salamon, the author of 
the single dissenting opinion, goes even further by stating that “in addition to 
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also declare the applicability of this requirement (namely the duty of ultra vires 
review – G.H.) to the whole of the State system”.39 Make no mistake, he did 
not dissent on the ground that the Constitutional Court exceeded the limits of 
its own competences, but because he thought that the majority decision “fails 
to provide a complete answer to the questions aimed at interpretation of the 
Constitution, as requested by the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights”.40
In an interview with Hungarian Public Radio, Viktor Orbán’s first jubilant re-
action shows how enthusiastic he was that the Court helped the government’s 
wishes come true by making up for the failed referendum and the Seventh 
amendment: “I threw my hat in the air when the Constitutional Court ruled 
that the government has the right and obligation to stand up for Hungary’s 
constitutional identity.41 This means that the cabinet cannot support a deci-
sion made in Brussels that violates Hungary’s sovereignty”, adding that the 
Court decision is good news for “all those who do not want to see the country 
occupied”.42 In the same interview, Orbán anticipated the next issue relating 
to which Hungary’s national constitutional identity can be invoked, referring 
to the latest eu plan to terminate Hungarian state regulation of public utility 
prices. He said that the European Commission incorrectly argued that compe-
tition in the energy sector leads to lower prices. “Therefore Hungary insists on 
reducing utility rate cuts and we shall defend this in 2017. Although this will be 
a very tough battle, we have a chance of success”.43 The next sign of the battle 
over asylum seekers was another speech by Viktor Orbán delivered in February 
2017, in which he stated: “I find the preservation of ethnic homogeneity very 
important.”44 On 5 March, a newspaper reported on Hungary’s treatment of 
asylum seekers, allegedly including beatings with batons and the use of dogs.45
39 Ibid., para.117.
40 Ibid., para.113.
41 In the context of the Constitutional Court decision it is clear that the Prime Minister was 
not merely referring to the possibility of the government bringing proceedings before the 
ecj, but to the Court’s established power to declare eu law inapplicable.
42 “Orbán: Brüsszel meg akarja szüntetni a rezsicsökkentést”, hvg.hu (2 December 2016), 
available at <http://hvg.hu/itthon/20161202_Orban_beszed_pentek_reggel>.
43 Ibid.
44 Speech delivered on 28 February 2017 at the annual gathering of the Hungarian Chamber 
of Commerce. See Éva S. Balogh, “Viktor Orbán’s ‘ethnically homogeneous Hungary’”, Hun-
garian Spectrum (3 March 2017), available at <http://hungarianspectrum.org/2017/03/01/
viktor-orbans-ethnically-homogeneous-hungary/>.
45 The report from Belgrade was published in the Swedish newspaper Aftonbladet: “Flyktin-
garna: den ungerska polisen misshandlar och torterar oss”, Aftonbladet (5 March 2017), avail-
able at <http://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/a/noLbn/flyktingarna-den-ungerska-polisen 
-misshandlar-och-torterar-oss>.
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4 What’s Wrong with Hungary’s New Constitutional Identity?
I have to admit here that both the failed Seventh Amendment to the Fun-
damental Law of Hungary and the decision of the Constitutional Court on 
the interpretation of the country’s constitutional identity look like carefully 
crafted documents that seem to fit into the discourse about constitutional 
identity under several eu Member States’ constitutional laws, as well as about 
national identity under eu law. Ever since its seminal judgment in Interna-
tional Handelsgesellschaft,46 the ecj has confirmed that national constitu-
tional norms in conflict with secondary legislation should be inapplicable. On 
the other hand, Member State constitutions can specify matters of national 
identity, and constitutional courts claim identity review tests for eu acts. In 
other words, national constitutional courts must retain the authority for – as 
the German Federal Constitutional Court puts it – ‘safeguarding the inviolable 
constitutional identity’ of their states.
Decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court, and other high courts, 
claiming jurisdiction to protect national identity usually refer to their co- 
operative relationship with the ecj, emphasizing their ‘Europe-friendliness’,47 
and aim to increase the level of protection offered by the eu.48 In the case of 
the European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transaction (omt) program 
about the ‘irreversibility of the Euro, the German Court in its first preliminary 
reference ever de facto declared the omt program illegal, and called on the 
Court of Justice to strike it down.49 But after the ecj ruling delivered on 16 June 
2015 reaffirmed the rule that a judgment of the Court of Justice “is binding on 
national courts, as regards the interpretation or the validity of the acts of the 
46 ecj, Case C-11/70, International Handelsgesellschaft mbH (17 December 1970), 
ecli:eu:c:1970:114.
47 See for instance the German Federal Constitutional Court judgment of 24 April 2013 on 
the Counter-Terrorism Database Act, bverfG, 1 BvR 1215/07. This judgment was referred to 
by the United Kingdom Supreme Court in R (hs2 Action Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State 
for Transport, 22 January 2014, available at <http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2014/3 
.html>.
48 bverfG, Order of 15 December 2015, 2 BvR 2735/14. See also “Protection of Fundamental 
Rights in Individual Cases is Ensured as Part of Identity Review”, bverfG, Press Release 
No.4/2016 (16 January 2016), available at <https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/
SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2016/bvg16-004.html>. This decision of the German 
Federal Constitutional Court on the European Arrest Warrant led to the Grand Cham-
ber of the ecj judgment of 5 April 2016 in ecj case C-404/15, Pál Aranyosi and Robert 
Căldăraru v Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Bremen (5 April 2016), ecli:eu:c:2016:198.
49 bverfG, Case No. 2 BvR 2728/13, order of 7 February 2014.
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eu institutions in question, for the purposes of the decision to be given in the 
main proceedings,”50 the German Court complied with the answer given by 
the ecj.51
Similarly to their German colleagues in Gauweiler, the Italian Constitutional 
Court in its preliminary reference order 24/2017 explains to the ecj the rea-
sons why the Italian justices think that the ecj Grand Chamber judgment of 8 
September 2015 in case C-105/14 in Taricco infringes upon the Italian constitu-
tional principle not to be prosecuted beyond the statute of limitation period 
that applied at the time a criminal offence was committed, and invites the ecj 
to correct or qualify its decision. As Davide Paris rightly observes, even though 
the ecj might well be unhappy with this development of ‘threatening refer-
ences of appeal’, it is better than seeing national constitutional courts invoking 
constitutional identity to decide whether and to what extent Member States 
must comply with eu law, without the ecj having the opportunity to express 
its opinion.52
In the framework of dialogue between national constitutional courts and 
the ecj, the Spanish Tribunal Constitucional emphasized the harmony be-
tween European and Spanish basic values and read into the identity clause 
confirmation that an infringement of the core principles of the Spanish Con-
stitution would also violate the European Treaty.53 Similarly, in the reading of 
the French Conseil d’État what is ‘inherent’ in the constitutional identity of 
a Member State is what is crucial and distinctive of it, namely the ‘essentials 
of the Republic’.54 The conclusion of the Conseil d’État in the case of Arcelor 
was that if the eu legal order provides equivalent protection of the principle 
of rights safeguarded by the Constitution, a review of the legality of eu law 
should be referred to the ecj.55 The Czech Constitutional Court, although 
50 ecj, Case C-62/14, Gauweiler (16 June 2015), ecli:eu:c:2015:400, para.16.
51 bverfG, 34/2016. Judgment of 21 June 2016.
52 Davide Paris, “Carrot and Stick. The Italian Constitutional Court’s Preliminary Reference 
in the Case Taricco”, Questions of International Law, Zoom-in 37 (2017), 5–20.
53 Tribunal Constitucional 13.12.2004, Declaration (dtc) 1/2004. Quoted by Monica Claes, 
“National Identity: Trump Card or Up for Negotiation?”, in Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz and Ca-
rina Alcoberro Llivina (eds), National Constitutional Identity and European Integration 
(Intersentia, Cambridge, 2013), 109–139, at 128.
54 See Conclusions of the Commissaire du gouvernement: Mattias Guyomar in Societé Ar-
celor Atlantique et autres, lecture du 8 février 2007. For the French version of these Con-
clusions, see <http://cuf.spbu.ru/PDF/Arcelor_et_Air_Algerie.pdf>. Quoted by Barbara 
Guastaferro, “Beyond the Exceptionalism of Constitutional Conflicts: The Ordinary Func-
tions of the Identity Clause”, 31(1) Yearbook of European Law (2012), 263–318, at 270.
55 Ibid.
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 reserving its power to review the constitutionality of eu law, at the same time 
reserved this possibility for exceptional cases, such as ‘abandoning the identity 
of values’ or exceeding the scope of conferred powers.56
If we ignore the Constitutional Court’s lack of competence to review eu 
law in the current Hungarian constitutional system, as argued earlier, what is 
wrong then with the decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, which 
also wants to break with the absolute primacy of eu law?
First, it is important to clarify the legal nature of the decision. It is certainly 
not aimed at placing the legality of an eu legislative act under review. Although, 
as mentioned, the parliamentary Commissioner in his petition to the Consti-
tutional Court referred to Council decision 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 on 
the quota system, he did not ask for a review of its legality, nor indeed did 
the Court provide a review.57 Hence the decision cannot be considered as an 
ultra vires act or as an identity review of the Council decision itself. It is rather 
an announcement of what the Court could do to review such an eu decision, 
whether it violates “human dignity, other fundamental rights, the sovereignty 
of Hungary or its identity based on the country’s historical constitution”.58
As the ecj has stressed in its standing case law on derogations, eu law must 
be interpreted strictly so as to be applicable only when the case at hand entails 
a ‘genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society’.59 
No strict and exhaustive list of constitutional identity-sensitive matters is ac-
cepted by the ecj, but taking into account the jurisprudence of the ecj there 
are some more frequently acknowledged issues, such as decisions on family 
law, the form of the State, foreign and military policy, and protection of the na-
tional language.60 The subject matter of the Hungarian Constitutional Court 
56 Decision 26.11.2008, Lisbon i, Pl. ús 19/08. Quoted by Joël Rideau, “The Case Law of the 
Polish, Hungarian and Czech Constitutional Courts on National Identity and the ‘Ger-
man Model’”, in Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz and Carina Alcoberro Llivina (eds), National Con-
stitutional Identity and European Integration (Intersentia, Cambridge, 2013), 243–261, at 
255–256.
57 Independently from this procedure, the Hungarian government, immediately after its 
Slovakian counterpart’s submission, also challenged the quota decision before the ecj. 
This procedure is still pending, but the ecj will not take into account the text of the 
Hungarian constitution in its decision or its domestically binding interpretation by the 
Constitutional Court. Why not? What if Hungary argued that a judgment constituted a 
violation of article 4(2) teu (the eu’s obligation to respect Hungary’s national identity)?
58 See the wording of the holdings of 22/2016. (xii. 5.) ab, op. cit. note 19.
59 ecj, Case C-208/09, Sayn-Wittgenstein (22 December 2010), ecli:eu:c:2010:806, para.86.
60 See these matters mentioned in Pietro Faraguna, “Taking Constitutional Identities Away 
from the Courts”, 42(1) Brooklyn Journal of International Law (2016), 491–578, at 506–508. In 
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decision was the quota decision of the Council, on the basis of which 1294 
asylum seekers would be relocated from Greece and Italy to Hungary, and the 
Hungarian authorities would be obliged to process their asylum applications. 
What ‘fundamental interests of society’ can legitimately trump the require-
ment of sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) teu here? As I pointed out ear-
lier, this could not be the alleged collective expulsion of asylum seekers by Italy 
and Greece claimed by the Commissioner in his petition because the Hungar-
ian Fundamental Law prohibits the collective expulsion of non-Hungarians 
from the territory of Hungary, and not from a third country. In other words, hu-
man dignity and other fundamental rights of refugees not staying in Hungary 
cannot be protected under the text of the current Hungarian Constitution.
Another problem with the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the con-
stitution is that it claims that ‘Hungary’s constitutional identity is rooted in 
its historical constitution’. But the substantive meaning of the text of the Fun-
damental Law on ‘the achievements of our historical constitution’ is utterly 
ambiguous;61 no legal-scientific consensus exists in Hungary as to its precise 
nature.62 Presumably, since the case law of the Constitutional Court prior to 
2011 has been annulled, it should not include precedents stemming from the 
Court’s accumulated practice of legal interpretation since the regime change. 
Justice András Varga Zs. in his concurring opinion claims that ‘the constitu-
tional governance of the country has been one of the core values the nation has 
always stuck to, and that has been a living value even at times when the whole 
or the majority of the country was occupied by foreign powers’.63 By contrast, 
addition to Sayn-Wittgenstein, Faraguna mentions the Groener judgment (Case C-379/87, 
28 November 1989, ecli:eu:c:1989:599) from 1989, and the more recent Runevic judg-
ment (Case C-391/09, 12 May 2011, ecli:eu:c:2011:291). Barbara Guastaferro also discusses 
the Omega and Dynamic Medien Cases (C-244/06, 14 February 2008, ecli:eu:c:2008:85), 
the Spain v. Eurojust Case (Case 160/03, 15 March 2005, ecli:eu:c:2005:168), as well as the 
Affatato Case (C-3/10, 1 October 2010, ecli:eu:c:2010:574). See Guastaferro, op. cit. note 
54. Besides these cases, Monica Claes also mentions from the pre-Lisbon case-law the 
Michaniki case (Case 213/07) and Adria Energia ag (Case 205/08), where the reference was 
to protection of the national cultural identity of the relevant Member States rather than 
to the more political form of it. See Claes, op. cit. note 53, at 131–32.
61 Because there is no list of laws officially considered as part of the historical constitution, 
an extreme interpretation could be that the Jewish laws adopted in the 1930s, earlier than 
similar legislation in the Nazi Germany, belong to it.
62 See Gábor Schweitzer, “Fundamental Law – Cardinal Law – Historical Constitution: the 
Case of Hungary since 2011”, 4 Journal on European History of Law (2013), 124–128.
63 22/2016. (xii. 5.) ab., para.110, op. cit. note 19.
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in my view, the thousand years of the Hungarian historical  constitution – with 
the exception of some brief moments, such as during the failed revolution of 
1848 or shortly after 1945 until the communist takeover, and also after 1989, 
when liberal democracy again seemed to be the ‘end of history’64 – the domi-
nant approach was an authoritarian one.65
5 Conclusion
When the Hungarian Constitutional Court protects Hungary’s current consti-
tutional identity using the pretext of protecting the rights of asylum seekers 
against collective expulsion, but aiming at not taking part in the joint Euro-
pean solution to the refugee crisis,66 it does so in a way that is inconsistent with 
the requirement of sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) teu. It promotes 
national constitutional identity without accepting the constitutional disci-
pline required by the European legal order.67 The reference to national con-
stitutional identity of Article 4(2) is legitimate only if a Member State refuses 
to apply eu law in a situation where a fundamental national  constitutional 
64 See the results of the research project “Negotiating Modernity”: History of Modern Political 
Thought in East-Central Europe, led by Balázs Trencsényi, and supported by the Europe-
an Research Council, available at <https://erc.europa.eu/“negotiating-modernity”-history 
-modern-political-thought-east-central-europe>.
65 See Ivett Császár, Balázs Majtényi, “Hungary: The Historic Constitution as the Place of 
Memory”, in Markku Suksi, Kalliope Agapiou-Josephides, Jean-Paul Lehners, Manfred 
Nowak (eds), First Fundamental Rights Documents in Europe (Intersentia, Cambridge, 
2015), 57–69.
66 In an article, Viktor Orbán warned the ‘unionists’ of the eu, who call for a United States of 
Europe and mandatory quotas, that if they refuse to accept the ‘sovereigntists’ desire for a 
Europe of free and sovereign nations, who reject quotas of any kind, the mainstream will 
follow precisely the course that Hungary has set forth to affirm its constitutional values, 
Christian roots, its demographic policy, and its effort to unify a nation scattered across 
borders. See Viktor Orbán, “Hungary and the Crisis of Europe: Unelected Elites versus 
People”, National Review (26 January 2017), available at <http://www.nationalreview.com/
article/444279/hungary-crisis-europe-unelected-elites-versus-people>.
67 This is what Joseph Weiler calls the principle of constitutional tolerance, which lies at 
the heart of what makes European integration possible. See Joseph H.H. Weiler, “In De-
fence of the Status Quo: Europe’s Constitutional Sonderweg”, in Joseph H.H. Weiler and 
Marlene Wind, European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2003).
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 commitment is in play.68 The Hungarian abuse of constitutional identity is 
nothing but national constitutional parochialism,69 an attempt to abandon 
the common European constitutional whole.
68 See Mattias Kumm and Victor Ferreres Comella, “The Primacy Clause of the Constitu-
tional Treaty and the Future of Constitutional Conflict in the European Union”, 3 icon, 
473–492, at 491 and 492.
69 See the term used by Mattias Kumm, “Rethinking Constitutional Authority: On the Struc-
ture and Limits of Constitutional Pluralism”, in Matej Avbelj and Jan Komárek, Consti-
tutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Hart Publishing, London, 2012), 
39–65, at 51.
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